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As the international public debate goes, the world should prepare for a rising number of un-
foreseen and even catastrophic events of a magnitude likely to affect entire societies, coun-
tries or regions (Grin / Rotmans / Schot 2010: 1; Giddens 2009: 10). Much of the debate fo-
cuses on geophysical events commonly ascribed to the global climate change: floods (such 
as in Pakistan), draughts and fires (such as in Russia), massive landslides (such as in 
China). However, disastrous incidents not caused by climate change, for instance earth-
quakes (Haiti, Chile) and accidental oil spills (USA, China), also contribute to this generalized 
feeling. In addition, there are some other global trends, like rapid urbanization and demo-
graphic change, which, together with climate change, nurture the prospect of mounting risks 
and challenges in the future.  
Situations where exogenous factors affect various societal subsystems (the economy, the 
political system, cultural patterns, the ecological system) simultaneously and in ways which 
transcend the boundaries of path-dependent adaptation can be labelled “radical change”. We 
assume that a growing number of states will have to face situations of this kind in the future. 
The way states deal with radical change will have enormous consequences for their respec-
tive societies. At the same time, the capacity of states to actually manage those changes and 
to muster the necessary resources differs widely, with many developing countries presuma-
bly in a rather weak position. The OECD (2008: 12) refers to this as resilience – “the ability to 
cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, or legitimacy”. 
In dealing with situations of change, states use power (Avelino / Rotmans 2010). There are 
three interrelated dimensions of power which together constitute the universe of resources 
states can bring into play in dealing with radical change: (i) The authority to effectively pro-
duce binding decisions, reflected in the political power game and its decision-making proce-
dures,1 (ii) the capacity to implement public policies, collect revenues and provide public ser-
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 The ‘facticity of rule’ in Habermasian terms, see Habermas 1992. 
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vices, embodied in the public administration and infrastructure, and (iii) the legitimacy a po-
litical order enjoys if its claim of acting in the common interest is acknowledged.2 
While the first two dimensions have been actively explored in the political science literature, 
the latter dimension – legitimacy – has so far attracted less attention. Legitimacy rests on the 
acknowledgment that a political order exists “rightfully” and that its exponents (the “state” or 
“government”) act in the common interest. Many scholars who explore the dynamics of politi-
cal change and stability do not consider legitimacy a useful (or even valid) analytical cate-
gory. Instead, they prefer to speak about “justification of rule”, “regime support”, etc.3 More 
recently, however, various research projects have deepened our understanding of legiti-
macy.4 Thanks to these efforts, we have gained additional knowledge on the different 
sources or types of legitimacy, and we are in a better position to assess degrees of legiti-
macy in different settings.  
Not all the studies referred to above would agree on legitimacy being a necessary element of 
political order, but there is a general consensus regarding the importance of legitimacy both 
for the authority to formulate and the capacity to implement binding decisions. As a matter of 
fact, every political order designed to last in time engages in the strategic procurement of 
legitimacy – an activity called legitimation in this paper. We assume that situations of radical 
change have a strong impact on legitimation. States will rely on (and sometimes modify) le-
gitimation as a response to changing preference orders and power constellations, striving to 
manage the situation in a context of insecurity and risk.5   
Against this background, the present paper aims at shedding light on how situations of radi-
cal change challenge the way political orders legitimate themselves. It parts from the obser-
vation that there are different ways legitimacy is procured. Individual political orders are 
characterized by a specific mix of legitimation modalities (a legitimation profile), which 
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  See OECD 2008: 12 and Carment / Prest / Samy 2010: 86-88 for similar frameworks, albeit with 
different conceptualizations. 
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 To give an example, one of the classic readings in the contemporary political science debate on 
the state, ‘Bringing the State Back In’ by Evans / Rueschemeyer / Skocpol (1985), does hardly 
mention the term ‘legitimacy’ at all.  
4 
 For instance, Gilley (2006) has achieved important progress in measuring legitimacy, with a spe-
cial focus on China (see also Gilley 2009; Holbig / Gilley 2010). Booth / Seligson (2009) is an in-
sightful study on legitimacy in eight Latin American countries. Kane / Loy / Patapan (2010) have 
compiled a number of studies on the legitimacy of East Asian political systems, as has White 
(2005) a few years earlier. Other recent contributions include Stark (2010); Patty / Penn (2010); 
Power / Cyr (2009); Gel’man (2010). These contributions approach the subject mostly from the 
perspective also chosen in this paper, i.e. focussing on nation-states. In addition, there is a lively 
academic debate on legitimacy in international or transnational settings, which escapes the focus 
of the present paper. 
5  Apart from ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legitimation’, this paper uses terms such as ‘political rule’, ‘political 
order’, ‘political regime’, ‘state’, and ‘common interest’. Since this is not the place for an in-depth 
discussion of these fundamental yet conflictive concepts, I offer some straightforward working defi-
nitions in order to avoid confusion: (i) ‘Political rule’ refers to the practice of producing and imple-
menting binding regulative and allocative decisions. (ii) ‘Political order’ is the overall institutional 
and normative setting in which political rule takes place. (iii) ‘Regimes’ are understood as sets of 
institutions, norms and procedures that cover specific aspects of a political order. (iv) ‘State’ refers 
to the part of a political order which defines the common interest (in terms of values and norms, 
but also in territorial, demographic and material terms), and which produces and enforces binding 
decisions acting upon that common interest. (v) Finally, ‘common interest’ is an interest that bene-
fits all members of a society (although not necessarily all of them to the same degree).  
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shapes the capacity of states to respond to radical change both in positive terms (providing 
key resources, stabilizing expectations and facilitating change) and in negative terms (con-
suming resources and precluding reforms).  
The following section introduces the concept of radical change from a political science per-
spective (section 2). The paper then discusses the strategic procurement of legitimacy (sec-
tion 3). The concept will subsequently be applied to the political management of radical 
change (section 4). The main objective is to assess the capability of existing political orders 
to manage change from a common interest perspective. 
2. Conceptualizing radical change 
Events like those mentioned in the introduction (earthquakes, draughts, floods, oil spills, 
wars, etc.) are typically the outcome of factors which mostly escape the control of those 
bearing the consequences. Although they are not necessarily unforeseeable as such, they 
are often unpredicted in their concrete manifestation. Economists refer to such constellations 
as external shocks.6  
External shocks constitute a factor of stress for the societies affected by them. The need to 
adapt to changing environmental conditions causes societies to mobilize additional re-
sources, to change preference orders or to rearrange institutional settings. Stress may be 
internalized by the various subsystems of a society in an incremental transformation some-
times called transition: “non-linear processes of social change in which a societal system is 
structurally transformed” (Avelino / Rotmans 2009: 543).  
The academic debate on transition focuses on goal-oriented action covering time spans of 25 
to 50 years. It envisions systemic change above all as a process that leads “from one dy-
namic state of equilibrium to another” (Avelino / Rotmans 2009: 544), following a non-linear 
pattern and passing through the stages of predevelopment, take-off, acceleration and stabili-
zation. The debate does account for possible alternative scenarios, with systems experienc-
ing lock-ins, backlashes or even complete breakdowns (Rotmans / Loorbach 2010: 129-131), 
but the ‘default option’ appears to be restabilization.  
However, a non-deterministic understanding of change would be very much in line with a 
political science view on political development, with an emerging stable order far from being 
the necessary outcome of societal change. External shocks sometimes generate an amount 
of stress which exceeds the incremental adaptation capacity of societies. In that case they 
trigger radical change. The term refers to situations characterized by  
– Stress affecting various subsystems (political, socio-economic, cultural, ecological, etc.) 
simultaneously and in a mutually reinforcing manner; 
– Drastic (non-path dependent) alterations of societal preference orders, affecting the mo-
bilization and allocation of social resources and the capacities for collective action; and  
– A generalized perception of crisis and insecurity among social actors, with a concomitant 
loss of confidence, and a shortening of economic, political and private planning cycles. 
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 For economists, external shocks are not necessarily negative. For instance, a revenue bonanza 
thanks to rising world commodity prices would be considered an external shock. However, in this 
paper we limit the analysis to events with an immediate negative impact on a society’s resources.  
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Radical change affects the quantity and quality of public services as well as the way states 
are perceived by their citizens. It may eventually lead to new constellations of power and 
legitimation, and to a new distribution of the costs and benefits arising from public action, but 
not necessarily to a general (re-) stabilization of the political system.  
The notions of external shock and radical change imply a certain acceleration of develop-
ments, but this does not necessarily refer to the underlying issues themselves. Sometimes, 
problems build up slowly over a long period of time before societies perceive their relevance 
and begin to deal with them. In facing exogenous change societies may also be able to main-
tain a path-dependent pattern of adaptation over an extended period of time before eventu-
ally reaching a ‘tipping point’ (Gladwell 2000) and experiencing radical change.  
External shocks frequently exceed the boundaries of individual states, involving issues and 
organizations at a regional or international level. But in our Westphalian world order it is the 
nation-states with their societies which receive the largest part of the stress generated by 
external shocks, even in the case of global events such as the recent financial crisis. 
The role of the state 
Putting the state at the centre of analysis should not lead to overemphasizing the role of 
states in modern societies. It is a well-established fact by now that there is an increasing 
number of actors, both internationally and domestically, involved in the provision of public 
goods. Also, along with hierarchical modes of political rule and public administration, heterar-
chical forms such as networking, consultation, devolution and public-private partnerships are 
employed in the formulation and implementation of public policies. As a result, social scien-
tists have long waved the idea of states (or governments) being able to steer modern, com-
plex societies toward the collective pursuit of a common good (Grin 2010:221). 
However, in dealing with radical change, states are still the most important actors (Meadow-
croft 2005: 493; Giddens 2009: 5). First, they are ultimately responsible for providing critical 
public services,7 such as protection from security threats, public health, transport infrastruc-
ture and disaster relief. Second, states are in charge of mobilizing societal resources neces-
sary to deal with external shocks. Third, they can be an important factor of integration, often 
making collective action possible in the first place. Fourth, they provide places and proce-
dures by which societies can agree on new norms, institutions and preference orders in the 
course of radical change. Fifth, they are key players in international politics and in the trans-
formation of international agreements into national policies.  
While societies experience radical change, states are supposed to manage it. This means, 
states have the primary function of organizing collective responses to stress from a common 
interest perspective. At the same time, however, as parts of society-as-a-whole they are also 
affected by radical change:  
To begin with, as a first immediate effect external shocks frequently undermine the capacity 
of states to provide public services and to mobilize resources at a moment when these ser-
vices and resources are most urgently needed. Often, shocks cause severe damages to pub-
lic infrastructure, or lead to diminishing public revenues from taxes, royalties, etc. Public offi-
cials may not be able (or willing) anymore to fulfil their normal functions. Sometimes, entire 
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  With the term ‘public services’ I mean to refer to the whole range of goods and services provided 
by public entities, including basic social services, security and legal protection, public infrastruc-
ture, etc. 
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territorial units (provinces, municipalities) or branches of the state (for instance, the security 
forces) may experience a total breakdown.  
Radical change may limit the authority of states to formulate and implement binding deci-
sions. Since change is often accompanied by growing levels of social conflict, it may 
strengthen actors who challenge the state by claiming superior authority for their own ac-
tions. Also, radical change may bring about alternative rules and procedures for the formula-
tion and implementation of public policies, imposing new institutional and normative settings 
on the state. The clearest example for this kind of effect is a military coup d’état. 
Finally, radical change can put into question the legitimacy of states. This occurs when parts 
of the society do not accept anymore that the existing political order is the best (available) 
alternative to serve the common interest. Shifting social preferences, for instance, may 
deeply challenge the legitimacy of a political order if the state fails to deliver on the new prior-
ity values of the society. Social groups may cease to believe in the superior qualities of their 
charismatic leader, or in the adequacy of democratic procedures. 
From this point of view, the question “How do states respond to situations of radical 
change?” has a “defensive” connotation: “How do states protect their assets (in terms of ca-
pacity, authority and legitimacy) from being affected by radical change?”, and an “offensive” 
connotation: “How do states employ their assets (capacity, authority and legitimacy) in order 
to manage radical change?”8 It appears obvious that individual states, characterized by spe-
cific patterns of capacity, authority and legitimacy, are affected by and respond to these 
situations in different ways. 
In principle, the best way for a state to protect its assets would be to assume an active role in 
the management of change. However, it can be said that the two connotations mark two ex-
tremes of state response to radical change: On the one hand, the state as preserver of order 
and defender of the status quo, trying to maintain stability, shielding the society from stress 
caused by external shock and sticking to path-dependency as long as possible. On the other 
hand, the state as promoter of innovation and driver of change, trying to mobilize additional 
resources, focussing societal learning processes and “inventing” new institutional solutions. 
From these considerations, a set of empirical research questions can be derived: (i) What 
are the basic patterns of legitimation? (ii) How do states maintain legitimacy in the light of 
external shocks and radical change? (iii) How do legitimation patterns condition the ability of 
states to manage change? These questions will be explored more in detail in the following 
sections.   
3. The strategic procurement of legitimacy 
As has been said in the introduction, the legitimacy of a political order rests on the acknowl-
edgement of its claim of acting in the common interest. Hence, it is based on a particular re-
lationship between ruler and ruled: the ruler raises a claim, the ruled accepts it – or rejects it. 
Since individual or collective acknowledgment is a crucial element of legitimation, in principle 
every individual or collective political actor can speak up on legitimacy issues. Opposite to 
                                                 
8 
 This mirrors Stepan’s (1985: 320-340) distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” projects of 
political regimes: Offensive projects have a foundational character and aim at overcoming lock-ins 
resulting from path dependency. Defensive projects are formulated in reaction to a perceived 
threat to society. They aim at preserving (or reconsolidating) a given order. 
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the claim of legitimacy raised by a ruler there is also a demand for legitimation expressed by 
the ruled. Nevertheless, not every demand has the same weight.  
– First, some actors enjoy more political influence than others because they are more ar-
ticulate, better organized, or control strategic resources. If these actors question the le-
gitimacy of a political order, the impact on regime stability or capacity is much higher than 
in the case of less powerful members of society – especially in a situation where societal 
resources get suddenly scarcer and distributional conflicts grow sharper. This is why rul-
ers design legitimation strategies geared towards specific groups within a society, spe-
cifically in times of crisis and change.9  
– Second, the impact legitimation demands have depends on a broad range of external 
factors and trends, many of which escape the control of rulers or ruled. For instance, if a 
political regime is already under stress due to a major external shock, an otherwise insig-
nificant action of a small group may acquire critical relevance. Also, a latent issue may 
suddenly become a crucial legitimation topic as a result of, say, economic crisis or the ac-
tions of foreign powers.  
– Third, not every legitimation demand is equally well suited to be put forward successfully 
within a given political regime. This has something to do with the type of legitimation 
(which will be discussed below), with the number and kind of people affected, the under-
lying value judgments and priorities, the social conflicts that shape the political arena, the 
time horizon of the issue brought forward (or of the solutions available), and so on. 
– Fourth, apart from national political actors with their demands there are international ac-
tors who may exert considerable influence over the legitimacy of a political order. This is 
why some authors even consider “international legitimacy” as a particular form of legiti-
macy in its own right (for instance, see Unsworth 2010: 28-29). 
– Fifth, in addition to legitimation strategies, every political regime produces formal and 
informal rules to deal with legitimation demands. These rules cover (i) the issues that 
may, or may not, be raised (e.g., many democratic regimes prohibit openly racist posi-
tions to be brought to the public), (ii) access to decision-making bodies, (iii) modes of 
demand articulation (rules for political parties, NGOs, public demonstrations, political 
campaigns, mass media, etc.), and (iv) the processing of demands by governments (ad-
ministrative, legislative and judicial processes, the use of police and security forces, etc.).  
Obviously, the less democratic a regime, the more repressive and selective its handling of 
legitimation demands.10 However, it is important to keep in mind that every political regime 
devices this kind of rules. In fact, they are a key feature of political efficiency.  
                                                 
9  Weber accounted for different target groups by singling out the administrative staff as a special 
addressee of a ruler’s legitimation efforts. See Weber 1976: 122. Today, we would recognize other 
holders of strategic resources, such as the private sector, organized labour, the military, traditional 
authorities representing ethnic groups, etc. 
10  The power resources available to impose rules, however, depend themselves to a considerable 
degree on the legitimacy a political regime enjoys. Consequently, there should be a point where a 
regime can no longer afford to suppress legitimation demands, because it lacks the necessary re-
sources to do so without putting in jeopardy its own stability. 
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A typology of legitimation  
Every scholar using legitimacy as an analytical concept identifies different types (or sources) 
of legitimacy. There is a considerable variety of types, but there are two basic approaches to 
the subject:  
– A first group asks what makes individual or collective political actors believe that a given 
political order, state or regime is legitimate. In many cases, social scientists refer to We-
ber’s (1976: 124) basic distinction of rational-legal, traditional and charismatic legiti-
macy,11 or to Easton’s (1965: 267-277) distinction of specific and diffuse support.12 
– A second group asks how political orders, states or regimes substantiate their claim to be 
legitimate. This group argues that individual beliefs may be based on erroneous percep-
tions, manipulation, habits or diffuse feelings. In order to qualify as legitimate, a political 
order must therefore possess some objective characteristics, which Beetham (1991: 3-
13) identifies as legal validity, moral justifiability and evidence of consent.13  
This paper argues that the distinction between legitimacy founded on subjective belief and 
legitimacy founded on objective characteristics of political order is flawed because it fails to 
recognize the dual character of the relationship: On the one hand, there is the strategic pro-
curement of legitimacy, a process where rulers have to give good reasons for their claim that 
the political order they represent serves the common good best. On the other hand, there are 
the political actors who demand specific legitimizing actions and who ultimately acknowledge 
or reject the claim raised by the ruler based on their views, preferences and expectations. 
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Source: author’s own elaboration 
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 For instance, see Unsworth 2010: 15-20 
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 For instance, see Stark 2010. 
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 For instance, Gilley 2009 bases his approach on Beetham’s distinction, even though he takes the 
notions as three different types of legitimacy rather than as three dimensions of a single concept.  
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The approach presented here parts from the observation that legitimation relationships mate-
rialize around individual allocative or regulative decisions.14 As a matter of fact, every alloca-
tive or regulative decision is characterized always and necessarily by six elements, each of 
which can become the target of legitimation efforts:  
– These decisions have a content which affects a specific group of actors; 
– They express value judgments and preference orders; 
– Someone issues them, acting at the same time as a person (authority) and 
– As the embodiment of an institution (authority role); 
– Decisions are produced and implemented through institutionalized procedures; 
– Finally, they rest on normative principles and ideas whose common denominator lies in 
the claim of the political order to be “good” or “adequate” for a given society.  
At each link of this chain, issues of legitimation can be brought forward and settled, or alter-
natively transferred to another stage. Take for instance the decision to depose a president 
and bring him to a third country. The content of this decision may cause considerable legiti-
macy problems, if parts of the population and the international community reach the conclu-
sion that the move is unjustified. These legitimacy problems can perhaps be settled through 
other material decisions (e.g., flying the president back in). But they can also be lifted to an-
other level, (i) by appealing to the underlying priority order of the decision (e.g.: “Protecting 
the nation from the president’s decisions was more important than following the rules”); (ii) by 
referring to the charismatic quality of personal leadership (e.g.: “Our new ruler has superior 
qualities which justify the move”); (iii) by alluding to authority roles (e.g.: “If the Supreme 
Court supports the decision, it should not be put it into doubt”); (iv) by bringing up underlying 
institutional issues (e.g.: “The decision to depose the president has not been voted by par-
liament. It is therefore unlawful and should not be obeyed”); or (v) by referring to basic princi-
ples (e.g.: “Every nation has the right to defend itself against tyrants”). 
Legitimation modalities 
As can be seen from the example, each element of regulative or allocative decisions issued 
by the representatives of a political order can be linked to a specific legitimation modality: 
Content-based legitimations employ material policies.15 They can be directed towards 
large parts of the population (e.g. distribution through social policies), but they can also be 
concentrated on small target groups, whose support is deemed crucial for the regime. This 
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 “Decisions” should be understood in a broad sense, not only referring to laws, regulations, orders 
or judicial statements, but also to specific actions by public authorities. Another political output 
which may impact on legitimacy is ideological or value statements. See Easton 1965: 352-362 for 
a typology of political outputs.  
15 Please note that this does not refer to the self-interested exchange of political support for material 
benefits. Obviously, this also exists in politics, and the boundaries between content-based legiti-
mation and the serving of particular interests are often blurred. Legitimacy as a resource can only 
be generated if the policy in question is accepted as functional for society as a whole, not just for 
specific groups. This, of course, may itself become the issue of political conflict: for instance, the 
recent decision of the German government to extend the operating time of nuclear power plants 
may be considered a decision for the common good by some, while others may look at it as a self-
interested decision in favour of a small group of big companies who support the government. 
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legitimation strategy may acquire crucial relevance at certain stages of time, e.g. at the be-
ginning of a new regime seeking to consolidate itself, or in a situation of acute political crisis.  
Value-based legitimations refer to a given order of preferences by emphasizing values 
such as security and public order, individual or collective well-being, personal freedom, cul-
tural identity, etc. For instance, if a political regime consistently refuses to address security 
and public order as key values, some parts of society may begin to consider a military coup 
as a legitimate response. 
Charismatic legitimations offer a perspective of political and social inclusion, typically 
achieved through the direct relationship between the individual political actor and an “enlight-
ened” leader. Their main advantage lies in relieving the political regime from particular legiti-
mation demands: trust or devotion to a person replace the acknowledgment of specific le-
gitimation claims, thus granting the ruler additional political autonomy and access to re-
sources.16  
Role-based legitimations focus on the “charismatic appeal” of authority roles.17 Through 
tradition, heritage, or alternatively a high and sustained degree of technical capacity, institu-
tions as such can become trustworthy. As a result, incumbents can change (for instance in 
the wake of elections) without a concomitant loss of trust in a public policy. For a political 
order, this legitimation strategy has the additional advantage of avoiding political questioning 
within specific policy areas.  
Procedural legitimations are based on institutionalized patterns of decision-making and 
implementation. Most importantly, through the mechanisms of political representation and 
legality, procedures endow individual decisions with a presupposition of legitimacy: citizens 
do not have to examine each and every decision that affects them. Rather, they assume that 
decisions based on established procedures can be accepted as “rightful” and “good” for so-
ciety as a whole. This assumption even covers future decisions, or decisions that affect citi-
zens negatively.18 Consequently, this legitimation strategy supports a broader range of deci-
sions in a more stable way than the strategies discussed so far.  
Normative legitimations refer to the basic ideas or principles incorporated by a political or-
der in order to qualify as “good”. The ideas of national identity, sovereignty and human dig-
nity, or the principles of democracy and rule of law may serve as examples. At this level, le-
gitimation often entails acts of symbolic integration, for instance the use of state symbols 
(flags, anthems), as well as the reference to traditions and founding myths (“grand sagas”). 
The inclusion of overarching norms and goals in political constitutions is yet another refer-
ence to this legitimation strategy.  
Normative legitimations constitute the highest level of the legitimation process: If legitimation 
succeeds at this stage, even blatant flaws at the other levels will do no harm to the regime in 
                                                 
16  See Weber (1976), pp. 140f for the original argument.  
17  See Weber (1976), pp. 142-148 and 662-679. 
18  It is important to bear in mind, though, that citizens are always free to stop assuming and actually 
question the legitimate grounds of any decision they chose to put into doubt, even if it is produced 
in the most democratic way. For instance, if a democratically elected parliament established obli-
gatory military service for male adults, some members of society could chose to disobey this ruling 
because of their religious or moral convictions. Their position would be that the state has ex-
ceeded its legitimate right to rule at this point. 
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question. However, if legitimation fails at this stage, it can not be compensated at other 
stages. In such a case, rulers can only react with normative adjustments, or else forego le-
gitimation at this point or vis-à-vis this group of actors. At the same time, political actors, 
once they reject the legitimacy claim at this stage, can not re-orient their legitimacy beliefs to 
other dimensions of the political order. Instead, they would have to adjust their own norma-
tive convictions, build up resistance against the regime, resign from participation in public 
affairs – or integrate themselves cynically in an order they believe is not truly “rightful”. This 
appears to be the case today of many citizens with an “immigration background” in Western 
Europe. 
Criteria for the assessment of legitimation modalities 
Legitimation modalities differ with regard to their design and impact. These differences can 
be assessed from four perspectives: (i) scope, (ii) reach, (iii) adaptability and (iv) cost. 
– Scope refers to the question whether legitimacy is procured in connection with a specific 
policy, a policy area / institution, or a broader set of policy areas / institutions. For in-
stance, the reputation of a central bank as an independent, technical body (role-based 
legitimation) generates legitimacy with reference to a specific policy area (monetary pol-
icy). In contrast, legitimation based on parliamentarian democracy (procedural legitima-
tion) typically extends to the whole range of policy areas subject to parliamentarian delib-
eration. Related to this is the question whether a legitimation modality may create a 
“stock” of legitimacy concerning future decisions (durability).19 
– Reach refers to the addressees of legitimation: is legitimacy procured from a small group 
of actors, from larger parts of a society (or international actors), or from society (the inter-
national community) as a whole? For instance, the decision to put a hold on a major dam 
project (content-based legitimation) may be crucial to (re-) gain legitimacy from the local 
population affected by that project. On the other hand, public adherence to the principles 
of human rights and dignity (normative legitimation) may be designed to gain legitimacy 
from society and the international community as a whole. If legitimation is directed toward 
specific groups, the risk is higher that it will be contested by other groups.  
– Adaptability refers to the question how a specific modality responds to changing legitima-
tion demands. For instance, for a military regime that bases its legitimacy on the promise 
of security (value-based legitimation), it may be difficult to adapt if the prevailing prefer-
ence-order happens to shift towards higher degrees of freedom once security is 
achieved. Related to this issue is the question of complexity, i.e. how many actors and 
institutions are involved in a legitimation modality.  
– Cost refers to the resources a political regime has to mobilize in the context of its legiti-
mation efforts. For instance, the mobilization of supporters typical for charismatic legiti-
mation usually requires ever increasing efforts, whereas in principle a modality based on 
rather constant regime characteristics (role-based or procedural legitimation) should be 
less costly. This category also includes the limits to revenue mobilization imposed by le-
gitimation, for instance by making it impossible to collect taxes from particularly powerful 
groups.  
                                                 
19 
 A “stock” of legitimacy is generated if political actors feel they can infer from the current situation 
to the future legitimacy of the decisions produced by a political order, a leader or a particular insti-
tution.  
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Complexity reduction is a basic feature of rule in modern societies: if political actors began 
questioning each and every decision that concerned them, the political regime would over-
heat immediately. Successful legitimation relieves both rulers and ruled from the pressure of 
rationalizing rule at every point and moment in time. Hence, the broader the scope, reach 
and durability of a legitimation strategy, the more important its contribution to regime effi-
ciency and effectiveness. In a period of radical change, however, other features of legitima-
tion may become even more important, such as for instance the capacity to adapt flexibly to 
changing demands, or the cost legitimation entails in terms of additional resource mobiliza-
tion. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the six modalities. 
 
Table 1: Criteria for the assessment of legitimation modalities 
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erence order 






rability hinges on 




sectors of society 
(“them” vs. “us”), 
may be contested 
Highly flexible High and growing 











Either broad reach 
or focused on a 
specific “policy 
community” 








tends typically to 
all political actors 







Broad reach, but 




ble, but can be 
shifted towards 
new collective 
visions and goals 
Rather low cost  
in normal times, 
but can become 
exceedingly high 
in times of crisis 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Legitimation profiles 
For a given political order characterized by a specific mix of legitimation modalities (a “legiti-
mation profile”), it should be possible to describe the resulting picture of scope, reach, 
adaptability and cost in form of a scorecard, where low, medium or high scores in each di-
mension are linked to specific observations (see Table 2). A political order that ranks high on 
the first two dimensions (scope and reach) is presumably in a good position in terms of effi-
ciency and effectiveness, while a political order with high scores in adaptability may find it 
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easier to adapt to rapid changes in the demand structure. If legitimation costs are already 
high under “normal” circumstances, they may become exceedingly high in times of radical 
change, particularly if there are severe limits to revenue collection built into legitimation.  
 
Table 2: Assessing legitimation profiles 
 





purpose regime”, no dura-
bility 
Medium scope, some is-
sues not open to legitima-
tion, some durability 
Broad scope, covering the 





Limited reach, catering only 
to the demands of a small 
ruling elite, very likely to be 
contested 
Medium reach, excluding 
some political actors or 
collectivities, some contes-
tation possible 
Broad reach, covering 
political actors nationally 






tionalized and with a large 




alized, partly open to swift 
changes by a small group 
of actors  
High adaptability, legitima-
tion completely in the 
hands of the executive 
branch, small number of 




No discernible costs, le-
gitimation embedded in 
“normal” functioning of the 
regime, no specific limits to 
resource mobilization 
Medium costs, substantial 
funds geared towards le-
gitimation, but no rapid 
increase, some limits to 
resource mobilization 
High (or rising) costs, 
legitimation clearly the 
priority of the regime, se-
vere limits to resource 
mobilization 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Finally, while it is difficult to imagine political orders with high scores in scope and reach and 
at the same time a low overall legitimacy, it should be noted that the focus is on the strategic 
procurement of legitimacy (legitimation), not on legitimacy itself: even political orders with 
broad scope and reach may experience legitimacy crises, if key political actors refuse to ac-
knowledge the legitimacy claim. The “strength” or “degree” of legitimacy at a certain moment 
in time is not necessarily linked to a specific combination of scores, even though some com-
binations appear much more solid than others. 
4. Legitimation in a context of radical change 
The preceding section has introduced the basic modalities of legitimation employed by any 
political order designed to last in time. It has then identified four criteria – scope, reach, 
adaptability and cost – to assess the legitimation profile of given political orders. This section 
discusses how states or political regimes maintain legitimacy in the light of radical change, 
and how their legitimation profile shapes their ability to manage change. 
“Radical change” was presented above as change (i) occurring simultaneously in various 
dimensions (economic, social, political, cultural etc.), (ii) leading to profound modifications in 
societal value systems and preference orders and (iii) linked to a general perception of crisis 
and insecurity. In such a situation there will be high pressure on the state to issue and im-
plement allocative and regulative decisions and adapt its structures and processes. At the 
same time, there will be a significant drain on public resources and a growing inclination of 
political actors to question the common good orient
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Maintaining legitimacy in situations of radical change  
There is of course a huge variety of ways through which external shocks impact on a society, 
and obviously also many kinds of radical change societies may experience. However, it ap-
pears that there are not so many ways radical change impacts on the legitimacy of a political 
order, as the basic issue at stake is always the acknowledgement of the political order’s 
claim to serve the common good. This paper argues that there are three main causal mecha-
nisms: 
– First, radical change can affect the way people perceive the provision of public services. 
This is first of all an issue of security and protection, since a generalized feeling of crisis 
and insecurity is a basic characteristic of radical change. In broader terms it can be said 
that radical change often leads to an emerging gap between what citizens expect and 
what states deliver. This causal mechanism can be called the delivery challenge. 
– Second, radical change usually alters the way people look at the distribution of assets, 
obligations and opportunities in a society. Those who feel that they are losing out in this 
process may raise legitimacy issues, not only in material terms (demanding compensa-
tions for welfare losses) but also referring to the procedures of interest articulation and 
political decision-making. This can be called the distributive challenge. 
– Third, radical change will often lead to increased levels of social mobilization – in a literal 
sense, referring to migration, internal displacements, etc., but also in a more political 
sense, referring to distributional conflicts, civic self-organization, etc. This kind of mobili-
zation may acquire a political dynamic on its own, causing a profound impact on the le-
gitimacy of the political order. This is the mobilisation challenge. 
In dealing with these challenges, political regimes (as long as they are designed to last in 
time) will try to manage radical change in a way that minimizes its impact on their power 
base and ensures their own survival. This entails procuring a minimum amount of legitimacy 
and maintaining the basic patterns of legitimation as long as possible. Consequently, states 
will act upon the legitimation demand produced by political actors as well as adapt the supply 
(active procurement) of legitimacy. 
In terms of demand, the original mix of modalities (legitimation profile) of a political order may 
become contested and competing legitimation demands may emerge (Unsworth 2010: 37-
40). States therefore combine strategies of adaptation and accommodation with a repressive 
handling of legitimation demands. The latter refers to the above-mentioned fact that every 
state controls access to political decision-making through a set of formal and informal rules. 
In this specific context control means that the state limits the scope and reach of legitimation. 
In general terms it can be assumed that states which already rely on a legitimation profile 
with limited scope and reach will be more inclined to recur to this repressive type of response 
to radical change. 
Facing the delivery challenge: In a situation of radical change, states often have to compen-
sate for lower levels of public service delivery by employing alternative legitimation modali-
ties. For instance, if radical change is perceived as the outcome of an external threat, rulers 
may rely on normative legitimation by using symbolic means of integration or appealing to 
basic principles of the political order, such as solidarity, national sovereignty, etc. This may 
cause citizens to lower their expectations in terms of service delivery, but it requires a certain 
amount of legitimacy in the first place.  
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However, if a state bases its legitimacy to a large extent on material policies (content-based 
legitimation) or on its leadership and technical management capacities (charismatic, role-
based legitimation), a consistent weakness in public service delivery will probably imply a 
critical loss of legitimacy. A procedure of choice may be to focus content-based legitimation 
even more in favour of groups who control critical resources (limiting reach), but there are 
important risks inherent to this strategy, as the level of contestation is also likely to rise. 
Facing the distributional challenge: Radical change obliges states to account for alterations 
in the societal distribution of assets and the issues citizens perceive to be important. This 
may be above all a problem for regimes or individual leaders closely attached to a specific 
set of values or a particular distributive scheme. States will often modify their spending priori-
ties or mobilize additional resources in order to accommodate changing preferences. It can 
be assumed, though, that the capacity to raise additional resources depends to a consider-
able degree on the legitimacy a state enjoys – both domestically and internationally. 
Still, states may also chose to stifle the articulation of alternative preference orders, limiting 
the scope and reach of legitimation.20 This in turn may lead to higher levels of contestation or 
even delegitimation. In times of radical change, the existing procedures and institutional 
structures of a political order may be questioned, or there may be a power shift between 
competing (for instance, traditional and modern) institutional settings. Maintaining legitimacy 
may require democratic regimes to seek accommodation with traditional forms of rule, in or-
der not to lose touch with local collectivities. 
Facing the mobilisation challenge: Social mobilization can lead to alternative institutions 
(procedures and structures) of policy-making, or to the emergence of charismatic leaders 
challenging the existing regime. Such a development can be a serious threat to regimes al-
ready relying on high levels of mobilization (charismatic legitimation), But perhaps even more 
importantly, political regimes with more institutionalized patterns of legitimation may also ex-
perience a critical loss of legitimacy due to mobilization, as it may turn out to be impossible to 
control the issues raised by the mobilized actors.  
Maintaining legitimacy in the face of charismatic contestation is a rather challenging task. A 
competition between various “mobilisation modes” can lead to total regime collapse. An al-
ternative strategy consists in lowering the level of mobilization by integrating the issues and 
values raised by the contester, for instance through a more value-oriented legitimation. Also, 
states can try to control mobilization through repressive action. Yet again, repressing the 
articulation of legitimation demands in times of radical change requires a certain amount of 
procedural legitimacy in the first place. Otherwise, such a strategy has the potential to un-
dermine the legitimacy of the political regime even more.  
Legitimacy and the ability to manage change 
In managing radical change, states may suffer legitimacy losses or even crises, but they can 
also use their legitimacy as an asset, strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
actions, promoting collective action and mobilizing additional resources. Also, the impact of 
radical change on legitimacy does not have to be negative: on the contrary, radical change 
can at times lead to a decisive (if short-lived) legitimacy boost. For instance, it is not uncom-
mon for political regimes with a critical lack of legitimacy to start external conflicts in order to 
                                                 
20 
 In fact, even the most liberal states suppress alternative preference orders at the margin of their 
legal and ethical system. 
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rally their citizens behind them. The accompanying mobilization often helps the incumbent 
regime, but the move is risky, as the costs of international conflict can lead to diminishing 
legitimacy later on.  
According to their legitimation profiles, states may be more or less tolerant to the stress im-
posed on them by radical change. 
Delivery: It can be assumed that states employing procedural, transparent and participative 
modalities of legitimation should in principle be in a good position to achieve a consensus on 
the level and composition of public services in the face of radical change. They are better 
suited to gain acceptance for long-term policies which link present welfare losses to major 
future welfare gains. An alternative argument, however, would affirm that in such a setting 
people will look at public services as an acquired right, being rather reluctant to lower their 
expectations. Rulers may then prefer to sacrifice the future well-being of society for the sake 
of legitimacy today.  
On the other hand, political regimes based on more adaptable and flexible legitimation mo-
dalities may find it easier to shape their supporters’ expectations. Also, they may react to 
critical losses of legitimacy in specific policy fields or vis-à-vis particular political actors by 
drawing on well-focussed material policies or value messages. Hence, their performance 
may be superior in the short run. In the long run, however, these regimes have to struggle 
with higher costs and higher probabilities of contestation linked to their legitimation modality.  
Distribution: In order to manage change, information is critical. Political regimes with regular 
transparent, free and fair elections (procedural legitimation) generate more information on 
the preferences and attitudes of citizens than regimes without (or with flawed) elections. Re-
lated to this, political regimes with a higher degree of decentralization are in a better position 
to receive information from and respond to local communities. To be sure, information per se 
does not bring about legitimacy, but it helps states to shape their response to radical change 
according to the legitimation demands of their constituency, and to address issues of equity 
and equality at an early stage of the political process and based on institutionalized proce-
dures. 
At the same time, though, it is fair to assume that political regimes with a broad-reach legiti-
mation are much more sensible when it comes to distribution, as they aim at integrating 
many political actors. For the same reason they will probably be less flexible in the case of 
conflicting preference orders. Regimes with a legitimation profile based on limited scope and 
reach are perhaps in a better situation to respond to this kind of challenges. Still, short-term 
success may come at the cost of growing contestation and legitimacy problems in the long 
run. Also, these regimes are obviously much more vulnerable in those cases where the dis-
tributive challenge affects their core values, issues or supporting groups.  
Mobilization: As has been said above, legitimation modalities with a high degree of adaptabil-
ity (located primarily in the executive branch and with few actors and institutions involved) 
may facilitate quick adaptation to radical change. Regimes endowed with such a legitimation 
profile may use their mobilisation power to raise additional resources, demand individual sac-
rifices and promote collective action. This legitimation is often more expensive and less du-
rable, though, making it necessary to transform it into more institutionalized patterns later on. 
In contrast, political orders that base their legitimacy on the broad, institutionalized integra-
tion of citizens will be less prone to mobilization and sacrifice. Yet, they possess the impor-
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tant advantage of generating a stock of legitimacy and promoting a general level of trust in 
social relations, making it easier for societal actors to organize collective action and thus put-
ting the collective response to radical change on a broader basis. 
5. Conclusion 
From the discussion in the preceding chapter a first important conclusion can be drawn: the 
‘degree of legitimacy’ a given political order enjoys at a given moment in time does not in 
itself constitute a valid indicator of its ability to manage a situation of radical change and to 
maintain its legitimacy. A regime (i.e., a specific historical constellation of rule) may be widely 
hailed for its achievements on a key political issue, only to be harshly criticized for its negli-
gence concerning another (and suddenly much more important) issue shortly afterwards.  
Obviously, the opposite is also possible: a regime with a weak legitimacy may suddenly ac-
quire additional legitimacy if it performs well on a specific subject. This happens, for instance, 
in cases of external aggression, when people tend to rally around their leaders even if they 
consider them complete failures on key domestic issues. Radical change may provide an 
important opportunity to strengthen the legitimacy of political rule, if a regime happens to rep-
resent the “right” values or the “most adequate” approach to change.  
Rather than legitimacy, it is the legitimation profile of a political order that shapes its capacity 
to manage change. In this context, some legitimation modalities appear to have certain char-
acteristics which enhance the capability of states to swiftly react to radical change. These are 
modalities with a limited scope or reach, with legitimation concentrated in the executive 
branch of the government and involving few actors, and with a high mobilisation capacity.  
Political regimes with this kind of legitimation profiles may even benefit from radical change, 
at least in the short run, even though they are at the same time more vulnerable to radical 
change if it affects their core issues, values or supporters. In the longer run, the costs of this 
kind of legitimation will probably rise and there will be a growing pressure to transform legiti-
mation into more institutionalized modalities (or accepting lower levels of legitimacy and be-
coming more repressive).  
Other legitimation modalities appear to be less flexible. Procedural or normative modalities 
with broad scope and reach may be rather slow in reacting to radical change. They are also 
less likely to benefit from this situation in the short run. However, these modalities (in case 
they have been employed successfully before radical change occurs) carry a stock of legiti-
macy crucial to manage change from a longer-term perspective. They may also be superior 
in generating reliable information on societal expectations and legitimation demands.  
The concept of legitimation presented in this paper allows us to assess a state’s ability to 
manage radical change by looking at the four dimensions of scope, reach, adaptability and 
cost. In terms of measurement and empirical evidence, however, more work has to be done. 
Recent approaches to measuring legitimacy (for instance, Gilley 2006) are based almost 
exclusively on the concept of procedural legitimacy, with a broad scope and reach. There is 
very little evidence concerning legitimation directed towards particular groups, or the costs of 
legitimation for political regimes. A scorecard approach as suggested in this paper may be 
useful to complement existing efforts and to account for other legitimation modalities. 
Finally, studies on legitimacy are increasingly confronted with the problem of congruence: 
Traditionally, political analysis worked under the assumption that regulations and allocations, 
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on the one hand, and legitimacy, on the other, were produced by the same actors and at the 
same place within a political order. In a growing number of policy areas, however, this is no 
longer the case. While regulations and allocations are produced more and more through 
markets, networks, civil society organizations and international bodies, legitimation remains 
largely a function of the nation-state.  
As a consequence, states face legitimation problems as a reaction to performance deficits 
that escape their scope of action. At the same time, external actors are increasingly able to 
legitimize or de-legitimize the political order (even though the latter appears to be much eas-
ier than the former). Looking at the strategic procurement of legitimacy may provide addi-
tional information on the addressees (the reach) of legitimation. 
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